Syria’s Coastal Region on the Brink: Sectarian Clashes, Islamist Leadership, and the Future of the Conflict

LATAKIA and TARTUS, Syria (SyriacPress) — Syria’s coastal region, long a bastion of Alawite power under the authoritarian regime of Bashar al-Assad, is now at the center of a new and violent transformation. As sectarian tensions escalate, the rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa — a former jihadist once known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani turned interim president — has fueled concerns of religious and ethnic conflict. 

Rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa: From Jihadist Leader to Interim President 

Al-Sharaa’s trajectory is emblematic of Syria’s chaotic transformation. A former leader of Jabhat al-Nusra and a key figure in Al-Qaeda’s operations in Iraq, his rise to power has been met with suspicion, particularly among Alawites and other minority groups. In 2011, he played a crucial role in establishing Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria under the directive of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who would go on to declare himself Caliph of the so-called Islamic State (IS). By 2013, he distanced himself from IS to align himself more closely with Al-Qaeda’s central command under Ayman al-Zawahiri. His forces later rebranded as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), portraying themselves as a more moderate alternative to other jihadist groups. 

By late 2024, HTS-led offensives, backed by various opposition factions, culminated in the toppling of the Assad regime. Al-Sharaa, leveraging his military and political influence, assumed leadership of the Syrian Transitional Government (STG) in December. However, his Islamist roots and the predominantly Sunni composition of his security forces have reignited sectarian animosities, particularly in the Alawite heartlands of Latakia and Tartus. 

Causes of the Unrest 

In the wake of Syria’s dramatic political shifts, a complex web of underlying factors has taken root in Syria’s coastal region. Deep-rooted sectarian tensions, an abrupt power vacuum following the collapse of the Assad regime, and persistent economic hardships have converged to create an environment ripe for conflict. Historical and contemporary grievances and rapid changes in governance have destabilized the region, setting the stage for the unrest that now threatens to spiral into prolonged violence. 

Sectarian Tensions:

The Alawite community, having enjoyed privileged status under Assad with many working inside or for the violent regime, now grapples with uncertainty and fears of retribution under the predominantly Sunni Islamist-led government. This anxiety has fueled resistance among certain factions within the community. 

Power Vacuum:

The swift transition of power left gaps in local governance, particularly in regions loyal to the former regime. These vacuums have been exploited by pro-Assad militias aiming to destabilize the new administration. 

Economic Hardship:

The ongoing economic crisis, exacerbated by international sanctions and the aftermath of the civil war, has led to widespread dissatisfaction. In coastal areas reliant on tourism, the downturn has been particularly pronounced, contributing to social unrest. 

Sectarian Clashes Escalate: Security Forces, Foreign Fighters, and the Alawite Backlash

The coastal region, once considered relatively stable despite the broader Syrian conflict, has now descended into a battleground. Armed clashes have erupted between Alawite militias — many of them former members of the Assad regime’s military or intelligence structures — and the security forces of the STG. These security forces, composed largely of former HTS fighters and Sunni Islamist militants, have been conducting regular security operations to apprehend former members of the Assad regime. 

The results of the security operations have not been transparent, and evidence against those arrested, as well as their whereabouts or well-being, has not been made public, accusations of indiscriminately targeting Alawite communities under sectarian pretexts. 

Adding to the complexity is the presence of foreign fighters within the security apparatus. Reports indicate that Chechen, Uzbek, and other Central Asian militants have been integrated into Syria’s new security forces, bringing with them a history of radicalism, exacerbating local grievances. This influx of foreign combatants has intensified calls for revenge from Alawite factions, with some militias vowing to reclaim control of Alawite strongholds along the coast.

Key Players

Transitional Government Forces: 

Led by Transitional President al-Sharaa, the new government’s security apparatus comprises former rebel factions integrated into a national army. Their primary objective is to maintain order and suppress insurgent activities, yet their composition and past affiliations have sown mistrust. 

Syrian National Army: 

The Syrian National Army (SNA) is an umbrella organization of Turkey-backed armed groups more loyal to Ankara than Damascus. 

SNA fighters have been used by Turkey to pursue its interests in Syria, as well as to fight in Libya and Armenia. Known more for its mercenary nature and criminality than for its fighting prowess, SNA factions routinely engage in infighting over spoils and territory and have committed executions, extrajudicial killings, human trafficking, abduction, extortion, and theft.   

Some SNA factions have also integrated former members of the Islamic State within their ranks. 

Assad Loyalists: 

Elements of the former regime’s military and intelligence services, particularly those from the Alawite sect, have organized armed resistance against the new government. Notably, groups like the self-proclaimed “Military Council for the Liberation of Syria” led by former commanders such as Brig. Gen. Ghiath Sulayman Dalla.

Dalla previously commanded the 42nd Brigade, also known as the “Ghiath Forces,” within the Syrian Army’s 4th Armored Division. This division was led by Maher al-Assad, brother of former dictator Bashar al-Assad, and played a significant role during the Syrian civil war.

Another prominent figure in the insurgency in western Syrian is Suhayl al-Hasan. Known as “The Tiger,” al-Hasan was a prominent military commander under the Assad regime, heading the Syrian Army’s special forces. Al-Hasan played major roles in the Assad regime offensives in Holeb (aleppo), Hmoth (Homs), and Palmyra. Forces under his command were known for their brutality and have committed war crimes and gross violations of human rights.

Coastal Clashes

On Thursday, remnants of regime-affiliated militias launched attacks on Ministry of Defense personnel and vehicles near the town of Beit Aana in rural Latakia. The assault resulted in the death of one officer and injuries to several others.

A second attack targeted ambulances attempting to evacuate the wounded near Beit Aana, further escalating tensions in the region, according to SANA.

In response, the STG deployed security reinforcements to the area. However, the armed groups entrenched themselves within Beit Aana and launched direct assaults on government forces, intensifying the conflict. Security forces established a security cordon around the villages of Beit Aana and Al-Daliah to encircle what was described as “remnants of Assad’s militias and lawless gangs.” The armed groups involved in the attacks were reported by the STG to be affiliated with Suhayl al-Hasan.

The fighting soon devolved into indiscriminate violence and reprisal killings. Estimates suggest that over 600 individuals have been killed so far in the recent clashes, including security officers, insurgents, and civilians. However, current figures are likely severely underestimated as the violence continues for a second day.

In a public address late on Friday evening, long after it had become evident that the violence was spiraling out of control, Syrian Transitional President al-Sharaa emphasized the unity and resilience of Syria in the face of challenges posed by remnants of the fallen regime. He highlighted the solidarity among Syrians and the alignment between the government and the people, urging collective responsibility to rebuild the nation.

Al-Sharaa condemned the regime’s violent actions, including attacks on civilians and institutions, and calls for their surrender and accountability. He praised the military and security forces for their professionalism in protecting civilians while stressing the need for adherence to moral and legal principles, particularly in handling prisoners.

Reaffirming the government’s commitment to ensuring civil peace, disarming unauthorized groups, and delivering justice through fair trials, al-Sharaa closed his speech by calling for strict discipline among forces on the ground.

On Saturday, however, the violence continued. It was reported that much of the more egregious and wanton violence was being committed by the more extreme foreign elements of HTS and members of the SNA. Among those deployed to the coast, and floated as being responsible for executions and looting, is the Ministry of Defense’s 25th Division now headed by former SNA commander, Mohammed al-Jassem, better known as Abu Amsah.

Abu Amsah was promoted to Brig. Gen. of the 25th Division by the STG in February 2025. Formally the head of the notorious Sultan Suleiman Shah Division, a member of the SNA, Abu Amsah was sanctioned by the United States in 2023 for its gross violations of human rights. According to Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ-SY), Abu Amsah makes tens of millions of dollars a year from various illegal sources.

Threat of Extremist Rhetoric and Road Ahead

A particularly disturbing element in this crisis is the rise of extremist rhetoric within the STG’s security forces. Many fighters — some linked to hardline Sunni factions and foreign combatants — have openly called for punitive measures against Alawite communities, with inflammatory messages circulating on social media. Derogatory language, such as references to “revenge against the Nusayris,” has intensified sectarian divides and spurred Alawite militias to mobilize in Latakia, Tartus, and the mountainous areas of Jableh. The recent seizure of Qardaha, Assad’s ancestral home, by pro-Assad fighters signals a potential resurgence of organized Alawite resistance.

The transformation of Syria’s coastal region from a secure stronghold into a volatile flashpoint is a stark reminder of the country’s fractured state. As Ahmed al-Sharaa consolidates power amid deep-seated sectarian tensions and a fragile security landscape, the stakes could not be higher. The international community and local actors alike face an urgent need for decisive action — whether through reform of security forces or serious peace negotiations — to prevent a descent into prolonged insurgency. The road ahead remains uncertain, but the choices made now will shape the future of Syria for generations to come.