Ahmad ‘Jolani’ al-Sharaa and the Feasibility of Governing Syria as a Modern State: The Iraqi Experience as an Example

By Joseph Sliwa | President of the Beth Nahrain Patriotic Union and former Member of Iraqi Parliament

There is no doubt that one of the definitions of a modern state is a geographically defined territory with diverse topographical features — rivers, seas, mountains, plains, etc. — where various human groups coexist, bearing religious, ideological, sectarian, and ethnic identities. It also encompasses intangible institutions that establish a philosophy for governing the state. However, these geographical features themselves do not hold any religious or ideological identity, nor are they capable of doing so.

The reality of the Syrian state — named after the Syriacs — and Mesopotamia is remarkably similar in terms of their diverse demographic makeup. The people of these lands carry distinct religious, ethnic, and ideological identities. 

In Iraq, despite the population’s religious diversity — including Mandaeans, Zoroastrians, Kaka’is, Christians, Baha’is, and Jews, all of whom existed thousands of years before Islam — the constitution granted the state an Islamic identity. This effectively nullified non-Muslims, elevating Muslims above them and imposing Muslim authority over non-Muslims, disregarding the historical heritage and contributions of non-Muslims. These communities were the original builders of the Iraqi state, dating back 7,000 years to the civilizations of Babylon, Assyria, Akkad, and Sumer, long before the advent of Christianity.

A similar situation is unfolding in Syria following the downfall of the oppressive Assad dictatorship, which ruled for more than forty years. Power has now been handed over to Jolani, who is a product of the same ideological framework. However, he has gone even further — not only imposing an Islamic identity on a country with a population that follows multiple religions and holds a civilization that dates back over 5,000 years, encompassing Arameans, Syriacs, and Phoenicians — but also assigning Syria an Arab national identity despite its ethnically diverse population, which includes Syriacs–Assyrians, Armenians, Kurds, and Yezidis. 

By doing so, he has marginalized all non-Islamic religions and all non-Arab ethnicities, reducing the state to the religion and nationality he himself belongs to. Jolani, like others who emerge from the Arab-Islamic ideological framework under various names, has failed to develop a vision suitable for the states they govern. They have not advanced to the stage of modern state leadership, which embraces all citizens regardless of their backgrounds. 

Just as the Iraqi people continue to grapple with issues stemming from entrenched sectarian mindsets, even after twenty years of emerging from official dictatorship, Syria is set to face the same struggles. As long as the regressive notion of assigning a religious, ethnic, or sectarian identity to the state remains at the core of Jolani’s governance model for Syria, equality, justice, and stability will not prevail in the foreseeable future.