Far Beyond Just Rafiq Nasrallah

By Hicham Bou Nassif | Weinberg Associate Professor of International Relations and the Middle East and George R. Roberts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College-California

Rafiq Nasrallah’s recent interview is worthy of attention. Not because the person is significant in Lebanon’s political equation — he is nothing more than another parliamentary hopeful among an army of aspiring MPs, a constant presence on television. Nor is it because Nasrallah’s analyses are insightful or useful — he is one of dozens who promoted the supposed heroic military performance of the “resistance” before its scandalous truth was exposed.

His words also carry little credibility. From his days in Syria’s Baath Party to his time at Lebanon’s Al-Akhbar newspaper, both countries have seen countless media and political figures cloak themselves in “Arab nationalism” or “leftism” as masks for hardline sectarianism.

This school of thought is not only shallow but malicious, and Rafiq Nasrallah is at its core.

Why, then, are his words important?

The answer is that the interview reflects the fervor within Shiite political and media elites, extending beyond Nasrallah himself. Notably, despite not belonging to the Amal Movement, his remarks align with Nabih Berri’s recent calls to abolish political sectarianism.

Berri explicitly said: “We want our political rights in this country. The system isn’t working. We want a rotation of positions. We need a new political system, from electoral law to ending sectarianism to sharing top offices. The Sunnis want this too. The Druze want a Senate. The problem remains with the head of the [Syriac] Maronite political establishment. You want the weapons? Take them. But let’s share power.”

This rhetoric reveals a Shiite consciousness driven by two factors:

1. An unwavering determination to dominate Lebanon, despite military defeat: Before disarming, the issue of political reform was not urgent for this group, their weapons alone guaranteed control, rendering the constitution a mere scrap of paper. But as arms gradually fade from Lebanon’s political equation, they’ve shifted tactics: leveraging demography, numbers and systemic change to achieve the same goal — dominance
2. Deep-seated hostility toward Lebanon’s Christian community: It does not matter that the Taif Agreement reduced the president’s powers or that key positions, like the General Security Directorate or Lebanese University presidency, shifted from Christian to Shiite control.

Nasrallah knows Christians have already lost much under the current system, but he wants them to lose “everything”. His implied message is that Christians have not lost “enough” as long as they have not lost it all.

By rallying Sunnis and Druze, he seeks Shiite expansion primarily at Christian expense, for now.

The reality is that Lebanon needs calm after decades of unending tragedy. The Lebanese people across all sects are a robbed, exhausted, and desperate people in need of respite.

But Nasrallah’s mindset, shaped in the lead-up to and during the civil war, remains stuck in that era. His consciousness is, in essence, one of perpetual civil war, swiftly pivoting from weaponized threats to demographic intimidation.

What’s to be done?

Firstly, Christians must abandon even the faintest notion of an “alliance of minorities”. Historically and today, the worst intentions, and most dangerous rhetoric, against Christians have always come from minority groups.

Within Shiite circles, a century of grievance politics blaming Syriac Maronites for their “marginalization” won’t fade soon, compounded by 40 years of Hezbollah propaganda and its psychological toll.

Secondly, Christians must come to terms with the unfortunate fact that the sectarian conflict in Lebanon and the Levant is endless.

It may evolve under different circumstances, but its core persists. Ignoring sectarianism to focus solely on corruption, the reformist narrative, or resisting foreign influence, the sovereigntist narrative, is futile.

Conversely, fixating “only” on identity as if other issues are secondary is equally misguided.

What works, on the other hand, is to simultaneously confront three imminent dangers: 1) the desire of the outside world to subjugate Lebanon, 2) the desire of some insiders for sectarian hegemony, and 3) the greed of a mafia that benefits from the constant tension created by the likes of Nasrallah, to prevent its victims from all components from uniting against it.

And this problem extends far beyond just Rafiq Nasrallah.

This article was originally published in Arabic by Nida al-Watana on 14 April  2025. The original can be found here.

The views expressed in this op-ed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of SyriacPress.