Ahmad al-Sharaa: Farewell, Palestine

By Hicham Bou Nassif | Weinberg Associate Professor of International Relations and the Middle East and George R. Roberts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College-California

A few days ago, U.S. Congressman Marlin Stutzman revealed details of his conversations with Syrian leader Ahmad Al-Sharaa, during which Al-Sharaa expressed interest in joining the Abraham Accords —the peace treaties between Israel and several Arab states. Stutzman noted that Al-Sharaa’s conditions for normalizing relations with Israel include preserving Syria’s territorial unity and halting Israeli expansion in the Golan Heights. This stance carries particular significance for two key reasons: 

First: Breaking the Palestine Taboo

Al-Sharaa speaks as the head of the Syrian state, a country that has historically positioned itself as the strongest supporter of the Palestinian cause among Arab nations. A closer look at Syria’s modern history shows that verbal pledges to liberate Palestine have remained a constant feature, regardless of shifts in Damascus’ political regimes—from civilian to military rule, Sunni elites to Alawite leadership, and Western-aligned leaders to those allied with the Soviets during the Cold War. Simply put, championing the Palestinian cause has traditionally been a cornerstone of popular legitimacy in Syria, from the era of Sunni notables after independence to the rule of Bashar al-Assad. 

For Ahmad Al-Sharaa to break this deeply entrenched taboo by contemplating relations with Israel indicates his confidence that such a move will not erode his popular base. It is likely that Al-Sharaa is courting Israel in an effort to deter it from supporting autonomy demands by Syria’s Kurds and Druze. This may well be what Al-Sharaa means when he emphasizes the preservation of Syria’s unity as a condition for normalization. Historically, the majority perspective in Syria and the region has often viewed federal demands by minorities as veiled attempts at fragmentation. While such considerations may raise initial reservations, they reflect a pragmatic approach rooted in local realities—an approach that stands in stark contrast to the pan-Arab rhetoric that has, for decades, muddled the political consciousness of Syrians and others across the region.  

Second: Rationality from a Sunni Islamist Leader

Ahmad Al-Sharaa is a Sunni Islamist. His pragmatic stance on peace with Israel continues what Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood set in motion during its brief tenure from 2011 to 2013. At the time, the Brotherhood upheld the Camp David Accords, disproving fears that Islamist rule in Cairo would necessarily lead to renewed hostilities with Israel. 

Two decades ago, Iranian-American scholar Vali Nasr published his influential book “The Shia Revival,” arguing that Sunni populations in the Middle East were heading toward extremism, jihadism, and authoritarianism, while Shia communities were moving toward moderation, rationality, and acceptance of democratic governance. Nasr’s theories deeply influenced George W. Bush’s administration and its policies in Iraq, but today it is evident that his analysis of regional dynamics was fundamentally flawed.   

From the Abraham Accords to economic modernization in the UAE, to Saudi Arabia’s transformative reforms under Mohammed bin Salman—including his remarks years ago that Israel is not an enemy—to Ahmad Al-Sharaa’s recent overtures, every rational and constructive move toward resolving Middle Eastern conflicts is emerging from Sunni quarters. In stark contrast, the Shia axis remains tethered to outdated ideologies and has exhibited some of the region’s most destructive behaviors. 

As a Lebanese observer of the region’s transformations and its emerging discourse, I am left with a mix of cautious optimism and lingering bitterness. The cautious hope stems from the possibility that something constructive may be stirring beneath the ashes of devastated cities and the bloodshed in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Perhaps this is the dawn of a long-overdue spring after a century of relentless wars—or so I dare to hope.  

The bitterness arises from the fact that Lebanon’s Christian community has long upheld the very principles now being embraced by this new discourse. From the beginning, Lebanese Christians largely supported the nation-state model over pan-Arab ideologies, preferred de-escalation with Israel over perpetual confrontation, and sought constructive relations with the West over revolutionary adventurism. Yet, it seems that the region has only now reconciled with these ideas—after its extensions in Lebanon dealt severe blows to those who upheld rationality amidst waves of regional chaos.

This article was originally published in Arabic by Nida al-Watana on 28 April  2025. The original can be found here.

The views expressed in this op-ed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of SyriacPress.