Lebanon’s 2025 Municipal Elections: Sectarian Snapshot of Shifting Power

BEIRUT — In a country still reeling from the scars of economic collapse, political paralysis, and the 2023–2024 conflict with Israel, Lebanon’s 2025 municipal elections offered a rare glimpse into the evolving sectarian balance of power. Spanning four Sundays in May, the elections — conducted under the weight of public distrust and widespread infrastructure collapse — reflected both entrenched loyalties and the stirrings of change in Shiite and Christian political spheres.

هل تعلمون أن للمخاتير دوراً أساسياً في مجتمعاتنا المحلية؟
من إصدار الوثائق الرسمية إلى معاملات الأحوال الشخصية والشؤون العقارية، يلعبون دوراً محورياً في خدمة المواطنين.

شاهدوا هذا الفيديو لتعرفوا أكثر!

Did you know that Mukhtars play a vital role in our local communities? From… pic.twitter.com/3Uvy4wp39k

— UNDP Lebanon (@UNDP_Lebanon) May 6, 2025

Shiite Strongholds: Stability Under Strain 

In southern Lebanon, where roads are still lined with war rubble and electricity remains intermittent, the results were as predictable as they were revealing. Hezbollah and its longstanding ally, the Amal Movement, ran on joint lists and secured sweeping victories in nearly all Shiite-majority municipalities, many of them uncontested. Their continued electoral dominance underscored their deep grassroots support, particularly in Nabatiyeh, Tyre, and Bint Jbeil. 

“Southerners are proving again that they are with the choice of resistance,” said Hezbollah legislator Ali Fayad after voting in Nabatiyeh, in remarks that framed the election as a reaffirmation of the group’s military and political mandate. 

But that mandate is being tested. Lebanon’s economic reconstruction following the war is estimated by the World Bank to require over $11 billion — a staggering figure for a state with depleted foreign reserves and a fragile central government. Western donors remain reluctant to contribute without tangible reforms, particularly around disarmament and state control of security.

Christian Camps: Fragmentation, Realignment, and the Battle for Jezzine 

While the Shiite camp appeared unified, Lebanon’s Christian political parties went into the elections deeply fragmented. 

The Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), once dominant among Christian voters, was hampered by internal dissent and the splintering of key figures into the Independent Consultative Gathering. This division cost the party significantly, especially in Tur Levnon (Mount Lebanon) and northern districts, where reformist and opposition-backed lists made inroads. 

The Lebanese Forces (LF) and the Kataeb Party seized on the moment. In Batroun District, a historic FPM stronghold, the LF-Kataeb alliance scored decisive victories in towns such as Tannourine and Chekka, marking a symbolic defeat for Gebran Bassil’s leadership. 

In Bcharre, long a LF bastion, the party held firm. However, a reformist list backed by figures from the 17 October movement garnered 40.4% of the vote in the town, signaling a clear demand for alternatives even in areas long dominated by traditional parties. 

In the district of Jezzine, results were more nuanced. In Jezzine town, the FPM, in alliance with the Amal Movement, secured a surprising victory, showing how strategic cross-sectarian coordination could still yield results. 

However, early counts suggest that the Lebanese Forces are poised to take control of the majority of surrounding villages and are expected to win the presidency of the Jezzine Union of Municipalities, although final results remain pending. The fragmented outcome reflects Jezzine’s unique demographic and political character as a Christian-Shiite mixed district and a battleground of shifting loyalties.

USUP: Strategic Vision for the Future 

Among the Christian camp, the Universal Syriac Union Party (USUP) demonstrated tactical acumen and strategic partnership in the 2025 municipal elections. The party reaffirmed its alliance with the Lebanese Forces across all municipal constituencies, emphasizing a united front to amplify Syriac representation in Lebanon’s complex sectarian landscape. USUP President Ibrahim Mrad highlighted the need to “resist the weaponization of politics” while calling for national sovereignty and decentralization as key priorities. 

In Zahle and parts of Tur Levnon, areas where Syriac-Maronite Christians have a sizable presence, the USUP-LF alliance focused its joint lists on local development and Church-community relations, securing modest but symbolically important seats. Zahle, located in the Beqaa Valley, is home to a Syriac community that comprises approximately 8 percent of the population. Here, the coalition between the Lebanese Forces, USUP, and the Popular Bloc captured an overwhelming majority of 14 out of 18 municipal seats, decisively defeating a rival list backed by Hezbollah and the Amal Movement just days before the polls closed. 

While precise vote tallies for USUP-affiliated candidates were not officially published, political analysts observed that in Zahle’s predominantly Christian suburbs — such as Al Birka, Al Qalaa, and Saadnayel — the united Christian-Syriac ticket outperformed its rivals by wide margins, ranging from 55 to 63 percent of the vote share. 

Beyond the immediate electoral gains, USUP has publicly renewed its long-standing demand for a dedicated and independent parliamentary seat for Syriacs in Lebanon’s confessional system, as opposed to the current single “minorities seat” that groups together Druze, Armenian Orthodox, and Syriacs alike. This push underscores USUP’s broader strategy to enhance Syriac political visibility and safeguard their cultural and religious identity within the Lebanese political framework.

Voter Turnout: Fragmented Participation 

Nationwide voter turnout revealed a patchwork of participation, shaped by regional disparities, logistical challenges, and growing public disillusionment. In Tur Levnon, turnout reached 44.6%, with Keserwan standing out as the most engaged district, recording a notable 59.4% participation rate. 

By contrast, North Lebanon registered a lower turnout of 35.9%, a figure that reflects a mix of voter apathy and mistrust toward political leadership. Akkar, often overlooked in national discourse, showed a higher level of civic engagement, with 47.3% of registered voters casting their ballots, a sign that local loyalties and community-based competition still hold sway in rural and marginalized regions. 

In Beirut and southern Lebanon, turnout remained markedly low, particularly in Beirut I and II, where years of neglect, logistical inefficiencies, and the absence of the sizable diaspora population from the electoral process continued to undermine voter mobilization. 

Nevertheless, in many contested rural areas across the country, residents flocked to the polls in greater numbers — not necessarily out of ideological conviction, but driven instead by deep-seated family allegiances and the promise of tangible benefits through local patronage networks. This dynamic, while not new, underscores the persistent disconnect between national reform rhetoric and the local realities that shape Lebanese political behavior. 

Local Elections as Prelude to National Change 

While municipal elections do not reshape Lebanon’s national leadership, they provide valuable insights into the ground-level loyalties and the ebb and flow of sectarian alliances. Hezbollah and the Amal Movement have preserved their dominance among Shiite voters, but cracks are visible as the cost of “the resistance” — and the lack of economic progress — gnaws at communities. Meanwhile, Christian parties are locked in an identity crisis, with the FPM struggling to maintain relevance amid defections and public fatigue.