Avoiding the Authoritarian Trap: What Syria’s New Leaders Must Learn from Assad’s Downfall
By Bassam Ishak | President of the Syriac National Council of Syria a member of the Presidential Council of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) Mission in Washington, D.C
Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024, Syria has entered a sensitive and complex transitional phase led by interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa. This period has raised urgent questions about Syria’s future after Assad. How can a new Syria emerge—one that avoids repeating the mistakes of the past and falling into another dictatorship, as happened under Assad? This central question leads to others, the most pressing of which is: What factors led to Bashar al-Assad’s downfall, and what lessons must any future leadership learn to avoid repeating his fate and triggering another national catastrophe?
On the domestic front, Bashar al-Assad committed a series of critical errors that ultimately brought down his regime. Chief among them was prioritizing the security apparatus over state institutions, fostering sectarianism in the distribution of power and resources, and responding brutally to the peaceful protests of the 2011 uprising. This response escalated the revolution into armed conflict and civil war. Widespread economic corruption and the concentration of wealth among a small elite close to the ruling family worsened poverty and accelerated the regime’s economic collapse.
These policies deepened national divisions, weakened state institutions, and eroded public trust. Most damaging of all, Assad never pursued meaningful reform. He insisted on violence and rejected any alternative political path—sealing his own fate. On foreign policy, Assad made the strategic error of aligning almost entirely with Tehran and Moscow. This opened the door to foreign interventions that turned Syria into an international battlefield, stripping the regime of its sovereignty and diplomatic flexibility. He also squandered opportunities to rebuild ties with Arab states due to his unwavering loyalty to his allies, and his regime became entangled in the spread of Captagon across the region.
Since taking office, Ahmad al-Sharaa has shown a notably different approach in several respects. So far, the results have been mixed. On the positive side, he has demonstrated openness to the international community and adopted a conciliatory and inclusive tone in domestic affairs. However, a major weakness lies in his inability to translate this rhetoric into real security and stability in areas under his government’s control. The risk is that Sharaa could fall into the same trap as Assad of making reform promises without delivering on them, thus losing the fragile legitimacy he gained through those very promises.
Externally, President Sharaa and his interim government have pursued a balanced regional policy, engaging with Turkey, the Gulf states, and Europe without becoming overly reliant on any one power bloc. This has opened valuable diplomatic space and helped persuade the United States and the European Union to lift economic sanctions. However, these gains come with conditions—Sharaa must fulfill the commitments he made. Therefore, both domestic and international credibility hinge on one thing: delivering on his promises.
Nonetheless, troubling signs have begun to emerge. These include the continued influence of remnants of the old security apparatus in key sectors, delays in transitional justice, and the slow integration of the external opposition into the political process. There are also concerns about the rise of new economic power centers that could reproduce corruption in a different form.
There is a core difference between the two eras. Assad’s regime categorically rejected structural change, while the current situation—though imperfect—still holds the potential to rebuild the state on new foundations. Ahmad al-Sharaa’s transitional legitimacy, both domestically and internationally, rests on his ability to follow through on his commitments. If he succeeds, there’s a real chance for a united Syrian future.
The greatest danger now is wasting this opportunity by repeating past mistakes: excluding opposition voices, sidelining justice, tolerating militia rule, or ignoring the informal economy. Syria’s future will not be secured merely by Assad’s fall, but by the nation’s ability—its society and political elite alike—to dismantle his legacy completely, rather than simply rebranding it. This transitional phase is a real test of the Syrian people’s political will to break with the past and begin anew—without reigniting catastrophe.
This article was originally published by Syrian Democratic Times on 6 June 2025. The original can be found here.
The views expressed in this op-ed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of SyriacPress.