Will Iranian Regime Fall? 

By Hicham Bou Nassif | Weinberg Associate Professor of International Relations and the Middle East and George R. Roberts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College-California

Broadly speaking, autocratic regimes typically fall in one of four ways:  

1. Foreign invasion after losing a war, e.g. the fall of Hitler and Mussolini’s regimes in World War II and Saddam Hussein’s regime after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.  

1. Voluntary relinquishment of power by the ruling elite, e.g. Spain’s democratic transition after Franco’s heirs gave up power in 1982 and Argentina’s shift from military to civilian rule in 1983 after losing the Falklands War.  

1. Military coup or internal power struggle, e.g. the fall of King Farouk in Egypt after the Free Officers’ coup in 1952, as well as dozens of similar cases in the Arab world and developing nations.  

1. Popular revolution, e.g. the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979 and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia in 2011.  

Before analyzing Iran’s current situation, two notes. Firstly. these four methods are not mutually exclusive. The fall of Egypt’s regime in 2011 resulted from both a peaceful popular uprising and the military’s decision to abandon Hosni Mubarak. Multiple factors can converge to topple an autocrat.  

Secondly, the fall of an autocratic regime does not guarantee democracy. A new dictator may replace the old one. For example, in 1979, Iran transitioned from the Shah’s dictatorship to an even worse theocratic totalitarian regime — a dictatorship merely monopolizes power, while totalitarianism seeks to control both politics and society. Similarly, Egypt in 1952 shifted from a semi-liberal monarchy with party pluralism, competitive elections, a parliament and relative press freedom, to a military regime that erased all of that. Change can open the door to democracy, but it does not ensure it.  

Now, to Iran today. Foreign invasion, like that which led to the fall of Saddam in Iraq, is unlikely. Even hardline US advocates of regime change do not consider this feasible.  

Voluntary surrender by Khamenei is similarly unrealistic. Where would he go at his age? If it happens, it would likely mirror post-Franco Spain, meaning the regime persists as long as Khamenei lives. 

A major popular revolution could succeed where the 2009 Green Movement and the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests failed. The Islamic Revolutionary Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) would defend the regime, but the key question is the regular army’s stance. Khomeini distrusted the military, executing some of its leaders post-1979. If the people rise again and the army sides with them against the IRGC, Khamenei could meet the fate of Romania’s Ceaușescu in 1989 or Iraq’s Nuri al-Said in 1958 — public execution. 

These are hypothetical scenarios, of course. No one knows Iran’s fate precisely. US-Israeli airstrikes may not help regime opponents in the short term, as internal resistance is harder under bombardment. Yet Iranians know that the regime wasted billions on a failed nuclear program, a collapsed Syrian ally, useless proxy militias, rampant corruption, a collapsing economy and currency, as well as global isolation.  

The regime’s ideology is bankrupt, its golden age is over and political Islam has brought only ruin. None of this suggests a long future for the Ayatollahs’ rule.  

This article was originally published in Arabic by Nida al-Watana on 23  June 2025. The original can be found here.

The views expressed in this op-ed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of SyriacPress.