Iran’s Regime: A Return to the Policies of the Sick Man

By Hicham Bou Nassif | Weinberg Associate Professor of International Relations and the Middle East and George R. Roberts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College-California 

The Israeli strikes on Iran have stopped, but the crisis of its regime has entered a new phase. The news circulating in the international press over the past few days paints the picture of a regime terrified by a Mossad breach — to the point that communication with Khamenei is limited to his closest inner circle out of fear for his life — while also appearing internationally isolated and anxious about its own people. This regime could have collapsed had the confrontation with Israel lasted longer, or had the United States permitted a direct strike on Khamenei. But Donald Trump’s administration had different calculations than those of the Israelis, who suggested that their goal went beyond the regime’s nuclear arsenal and put the very existence of the regime in question. Iran was defeated in the confrontation and humiliated militarily, but its regime will persist — for now.  

The Ottoman Empire, which fell after the First World War, could have collapsed a century earlier. It didn’t, because the Europeans were divided over how to divide its spoils. There is something similar happening now. 

On one hand, Trump rushed to end the war because his base elected him to halt American entanglements in Middle Eastern conflicts. And although the administration of George W. Bush, dominated by neoconservatives, was also Republican, the new Republican Party has turned away from the ideology of foreign intervention and democracy promotion following its failures in Iraq. These internal transformations in America saved the mullah regime — and perhaps even saved Khamenei’s head, if what Trump said is true, that he prevented Netanyahu from killing the Iranian leader. 

Saudi Arabia also has strong influence in Washington, and it is no coincidence that Trump’s first foreign visit was to Riyadh. Saudi Arabia fears the fallout of the regime’s collapse, as the explosion of a country with nearly 90 million people just across the Persian Gulf would bring troubles it prefers to avoid. Moreover, the downfall of the mullah regime at the hands of Israeli force would inaugurate an era of total Israeli dominance in the region — something the Saudis fear, just as they once feared Iran at the height of its axis. 

These American and Gulf calculations collided with the Israeli push to topple the mullah regime and temporarily curbed it. Hence, the defeated Iran now resembles the Ottoman Empire a century ago: a state that persists not because it is strong, but because the truly powerful are not united in bringing it down.  

It is not the first time that American calculations in the region have diverged from those of Israel. In 1982, Ronald Reagan’s administration rejected Ariel Sharon’s plan to invade Lebanon. Contrary to what many think, the invasion happened despite the United States and against its will — not in coordination with it. Later, in September 1982, Reagan launched a Middle East peace initiative, and again, the United States and Israel clashed: the former sought to give Palestinians in the West Bank a form of autonomy within a confederal framework with Jordan, while the latter wanted the West Bank for itself (and still does). 

The allies also diverged on Lebanon. Israel wanted to address the Lebanese issue as an isolated file, regardless of developments in the West Bank. The United States, however, linked the Lebanese issue to regional peace, acting on the basis that resolving Lebanon would pave the way for a broader Middle East solution.  

Thus, Israeli and American calculations diverged, and from that gap, Hafez al-Assad slipped in to sabotage both American and Israeli projects in Lebanon. We now understand that Reagan’s intentions toward Lebanon were good, but his calculations were flawed. And if it is indeed true that eliminating Khamenei and his regime was possible, but Washington prevented it, then the Iranian people under the mullahs will pay the price — just as the Lebanese paid the price for failed American policies, the departure of the Marines in 1984, and the dominance of Hafez al-Assad over them. 

True, the Assad regime eventually collapsed, but the Lebanese and Syrians endured additional horrific decades under it. Had he been defeated in Lebanon in 1982, it could have paved the way to strike him in Syria. In the same vein, even though the Iranian regime today is the sick man of the East, and the post-mullah era in Iran appears on the horizon, this does not mean that the suffering of Iranians under the mullahs has ended. On the contrary, the sick man — expelled from the region — is by definition a fearful man, and, therefore, increasingly brutal against his opponents at home. 

This article was originally published in Arabic by Nida al-Watana on 30 June 2025. The original can be found here. 

The views expressed in this op-ed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of SyriacPress. 

The views expressed in this op-ed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of SyriacPress.