On the Shiite Roots of Sunni Extremism

By Hisham Bou Nassif | Weinberg Associate Professor of International Relations and the Middle East and George R. Roberts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College-California

The cry of “Allahu Akbar” rang out intensely in the videos of the Druze civilians being killed—videos that circulated widely on social media following the events in Suwayda. In this, the tragedy is twofold: that the crime occurred at all, and that the perpetrators believed they were serving their religion by committing it. From the bombings of Shiite imams’ shrines in Iraq and the massacres of Zarqawi there, to the crimes of al-Nusra and al-Qaeda against the Druze during the Syrian civil war, and from the genocide of the Yazidis in Sinjar to the recent slaughter of Alawites—and, of course, a long list of attacks on “Nasaraa” (Christians), the most recent being the suicide bombing at St. Elias Church in Syria—Sunni extremism has left behind a trail of horrors that chills the blood. 

Silence about extremist Sunni movements in the region—from their earliest ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, and Osama bin Laden to today’s Syrian warlord, al-Jolani—is not an option. Any choice the Druze of Syria make today—or that any community threatened with extermination by jihadists makes—is justified, so long as it remains within the bounds of self-defense, not aggression against others. 

That said, supporters of the Shiite axis in the region are the last who have the right to complain about the crimes of Sunni extremists, for several reasons. First, the atrocities committed by the Shiite axis against Sunni populations in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon—and elsewhere—far exceed those committed by Sunni extremists. Shiite commentators who have recently shed crocodile tears over the Druze victims in Suwayda should be reminded that Bashar al-Assad has overseen the killing of half a million Syrians since 2011—most of them Sunnis. They should also be reminded that Hezbollah sent thousands of fighters to Syria to help Assad spill even more Sunni blood. 

They should be reminded as well of the dozens of jihadists who were imprisoned by their ally Bashar al-Assad at the outset of the Syrian civil war, then released deliberately because he wanted the uprising to take on an Islamist character. Among those released were Ali Musa al-Shawakh (Abu Luqman), who later became a senior ISIS commander; Zahran Alloush, who led Jaysh al-Islam; Hassan Abboud, the founder of Ahrar al-Sham; and others. Anyone with such a record is in no position to give advice now—and if he does, it is only because shamelessness is one of his traits, along with brutality. 

On a purely moral level, the followers of Khamenei, Hassan Nasrallah, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and similar Shiite factions across the region are guilty of crimes even more heinous than those of ISIS, al-Nusra, or al-Qaeda. 

On a psychological and political level, the crimes committed by Shiite extremists have served as powerful propaganda used by their Sunni counterparts to inflame emotions and recruit volunteers under the banner of defending their own community.

On another note, it should also be remembered that the black wave of Islamism that has loomed over the region for decades began with Khomeini’s rise to power in Iran in 1979. True, the founding movement of political Islam—namely, the Muslim Brotherhood—was established in Egypt by the Sunni preacher Hassan al-Banna decades earlier. But Khomeini’s victory demonstrated to Islamist movements that seizing power was a real and tangible possibility. What had previously been theoretical became a practical blueprint for seizing power. 

It was no coincidence, then, that just months after Khomeini’s return to Iran in February 1979, Sunni jihadists led by Juhayman al-Otaybi seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca that November. Nor was it coincidence that Saeed Shaaban, one of the most dangerous and militant Sunni Islamist leaders in Lebanon during the civil war, was close to Khomeini. There is no space here for a full account of Khomeini’s influence on Sunni extremists—but suffice it to say, his camp is the last one entitled to complain about them. 

In short: the crocodile tears and lofty sentiments that Shiite commentators in Lebanon have recently shown toward the Druze, Christians, and other minorities are politely declined. Citing the events in Suwayda to revive the tired claim that Hezbollah’s weapons are a guarantee for minorities against Sunni extremism deserves little more than a smirk. Yes, Hezbollah is currently the enemy of Sunni jihadists—but in this case, the enemy of my enemy is most certainly not my friend.

This article was originally published in Arabic by Nida al-Watana on 28 July 2025. The original can be found here. 

The views expressed in this op-ed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of SyriacPress.