24/08/2025

New electoral law exposes deepening divisions in post-Assad Syria

DARAMSUQ (DAMASCUS) / NORTH AND EAST SYRIA — Following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, overthrown by the dissolved “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” (HTS) and allied factions led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, Syrians saw a moment of promise. For many, it was the first real chance to break from authoritarian rule and imagine a democratic state built on laws that respect political and ethnic diversity. For long-marginalized communities, including Syriacs (Chaldeans-Assyrians-Arameans), Arabs, Kurds, Druze, Yazidi, and Armenians, the new era carried the promise of recognition and a rightful place in shaping Syria’s future.

Hopes for change began to fade as Ahmad al-Sharaa, who assumed the presidency without elections, made decision after decision that cast doubt on Syria’s future. His latest move, Decree No. 143, established a “provisional” electoral system for the People’s Council. The law, consisting of 54 articles across 13 chapters, set rules for candidates, reserved 20% of seats for women, and guaranteed representation for families of martyrs and former detainees.

The People’s Council will have 210 members, with al-Sharaa appointing one-third directly. The rest are elected through committees, but all results require his approval. Anyone linked to the former Assad regime is barred from running, no matter their local support or experience

Despite widespread outrage, both inside Syria and internationally, the government pressed ahead, effectively sidelining entire segments of the Syrian population from the parliamentary elections. Matters escalated when the Higher Committee for Elections postponed voting in Raqqa, Hasakah, (in the Region of North and East Syria), and Suwayda, citing “security concerns.” The Committee insisted that seats for those governorates would be “reserved” until conditions allowed for voting. Yet critics interpreted this as a deliberate maneuver to keep millions of citizens outside the process.

In a sharply worded statement, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of the Region of North and East Syria (DAARNES) condemned the move. “Syrians have sacrificed for true citizenship rights, foremost among them the right to free and fair candidacy and elections. Yet, we see history repeating itself, as this right is once again stripped away from all Syrians,” DAARNES said. It described the upcoming elections as “undemocratic,” arguing that they do not reflect the will of Syrians. Instead, the process continues the long-standing marginalization and exclusion that Syrians endured for more than six decades under Ba’ath rule.

The DAARNES accused Daramsuq (Damascus) of fabricating instability to justify disenfranchisement. “Labeling our regions as “unsafe” is untrue,” the statement declared, noting that the regions in North and East Syria remain more stable than many regions where elections are allowed to proceed.

Dr. Walid Phares, an American foreign relations advisor and former advisor to President Trump, commented on the recent decision in a post on X, saying that the “HTS regime” in Daramsuq (Damascus) prevented elections in Suwayda and most areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces, adding that this would effectively block local communities— including Syriacs (Chaldean-Assyrian-Aramean), Kurds, Arabs, and Druze— from participating in the electoral process, despite international advice to the contrary. 

Phares suggested that; “In response, Souaida and the northeast could consider holding their own elections on the same date, under international monitoring.” He added that these southern and northeastern regions could establish their own autonomous assemblies to represent their residents.



“Suwayda governorate and SDF-controlled areas could organize a referendum in their territories on the same day with observers, and perhaps hold local elections, as a step toward self-determination,” Phares suggested in another post.  

The crisis leaves Syrians with urgent questions. Will Daramsuq (Damascus) honor its promise to reserve seats for these governorates, or will President al-Sharaa choose their representatives himself? Is the government signaling that representation cannot occur without its direct control? And, in response, will the DAARNES and Suwayda pursue what Phares suggested—holding local referendums or elections to determine their own fate?