The Lebanese Army’s Moment
By Hicham Bou Nassif | Weinberg Associate Professor of International Relations and the Middle East and George R. Roberts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College-California
What can be expected of the Lebanese Army today, while Lebanon faces one of the most critical junctures in its contemporary history?
The wrong answer to this question is “preserving its unity,” for two reasons.
Firstly, armies do not exist to preserve their own unity but to carry out the decisions of legitimate political authorities. Giving priority to preserving an army’s unity means turning military institutions into an end in themselves. But they are not. Armies are a means, and their purpose is to execute orders.
Secondly, no army in a multi-sectarian state has maintained its unity when its ethnic and religious components disagreed. The Yugoslav Army exploded when Yugoslavia did in the 1990s, as did the Nigerian Army before that, and the Syrian Army after 2011. The Lebanese Army itself lost its unity during the Lebanese civil war and attempts to rebuild it failed twice. We must cease treating the Lebanese Army’s unity as a sort of red line, for which all other compromises are sacrificed simply to avoid crossing it.
To be even clearer, we must reconcile ourselves with the possibility that a segment of Lebanese Army officers and soldiers would break away if the army were to do its duty in the current phase.
For months, Hezbollah has been threatening, through its media outlets, to split the ranks of the Lebanese Army if it dares to implement the government’s decision to monopolize arms in the hands of the state. It doesn’t take much imagination to understand that this refers to Shia officers and soldiers in the Lebanese Army, who are inevitably influenced by their environment, which is almost entirely aligned with Hezbollah’s weapons.
The ultimatum Hezbollah is presenting to the Lebanese Army is clear: We will allow you to preserve your unity, in exchange for the state continuing its long-standing abandonment of its right and duty to monopolize arms, and for you, the Lebanese Army, to remain a decorative piece that does not disturb our control over Lebanon. Or, we will instruct the Shia elements in the army to leave, and even perhaps to attack it, and society as well, if the army dares to apply the decisions to monopolize arms.
The Lebanese government’s response to this logic should also be clear. The natural place for Shia officers and soldiers of the army is alongside their comrades in army ranks. They have the same rights and duties as others. But if they rebel, the applicable military laws and procedures will be applied to them. But in both cases, whether they stay or leave, the decision to disarm is non-negotiable. It will be implemented.
This should be the policy of the Lebanese government. As for the army, it should not have a policy at all, it only carries out the government’s orders.
A few days ago, Al-Akhbar newspaper claimed that the Lebanese Army Commander Rodolphe Haykal stated that he would prefer to resign than shed Lebanese blood.
The Army Command’s Orientation Directorate responded with a statement saying that the military institution would act “in accordance with the decision of the political authority,” while “preserving the security of the nation and its internal stability.”
Following the decisions of the political authority is entirely appropriate and aligns precisely with the established role of the Army, as previously noted. But adding the clause about preserving internal stability is not clear. What if implementing the political authority’s decision necessitates a military confrontation with Hezbollah? What does the Army do then? Carry out the authority’s decision, or barricade itself in its barracks to avoid threatening “stability”?
Although many were optimistic about the Army Command’s response and saw it as a denial of what Al-Akhbar reported, I refrained from optimism because I felt that the Command was still trying to have it both ways, even though the phase does not tolerate grey areas and “no victor, no vanquished” compromises.
Indeed, my memory holds the names of a long list of army officers who sided against their country’s interest in its most difficult circumstances.
To recall, many Lebanese collaborated with the Syrian occupation, but no one aided the Syrians against Lebanon like Émile Lahoud and Jamil al-Sayyed, both from the army.
Many also surrendered to the Shia militia, but no one surrendered to it and handed over his mandate like Michel Aoun, also from the army.
Coming to mind, from the war era, is a series of officers who sided with the archenemies of Lebanon during the Syrian and Palestinian occupations, names that the memory of the Lebanese has not forgotten, and should not forget, such as Ahmed al-Khatib, Majid Karami, and especially Walid Sukkarieh.
This series continues today through retired officers who occupy TV screens and fill them with theorizing about the “Resistance,” like Munir Shihadeh and Marwan Charbel, noting that there are media reports that raise suspicions about senior army officers allegedly handing over sensitive security information to Hezbollah, such as head of Military intelligence in south Lebanon, Suheyl Bahij Harb.
Of course, all these do not represent the entirety of the Lebanese Army, which also includes, for example and not limitation, the valiant martyr Captain Samir al-Ashkar, the heroes of the famous Battle of Al-Fayadiyah in 1978, and thousands of men who fought fiercely in defense of their country in the 8th, 5th, and 10th Brigades, the Commando Regiment, the Strike Force, and other brigades and units, under the most difficult circumstances during the war.
The officers and soldiers who fell recently in the south are a continuation of this noble procession of Lebanon’s heroes.
In short, from the Lebanese Army came officers and soldiers who are the pride of their country. And others who betrayed it.
All eyes are now on Rodolphe Haykal, whom we do not know much about.
His task is difficult. But his choice is easy, or at least it should be.
This is the Lebanese Army’s moment. Our hearts are with it, and the judgment of its Commander is suspended, awaiting what comes next.
This article was originally published in Arabic by Nida al-Watana on 1 September 2025. The original can be found here.
The views expressed in this op-ed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of SyriacPress.