The Long Struggle to Acknowledge the Sayfo Genocide
Since the early 1990s, the Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean) diaspora has campaigned for formal recognition of the 1915 Sayfo Genocide committed by the Ottoman Empire against the Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean) people. Today a handful of countries and parliaments have officially acknowledged the Sayfo, usually alongside the Armenian and Greek genocides which happen at the same time. Key milestones include the International Association of Genocide Scholars passed a resolution formally recognizing the Sayfo genocide in 2007.
Atrocities included the forced conscription and mass murder of young men, the destruction of villages and churches, and the deportation and massacre of women, children, and the elderly. Historical estimates put the toll in the hundreds of thousands of Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean) deaths and even more forced into displacement. These killings, carried out by Ottoman forces, often with Kurdish irregulars, occurred in eastern Anatolia and neighboring regions, including Persia — tens of thousands of Syriacs (Arameans–Assyrians–Chaldeans) lost their lives in Persia’s Azerbaijan region during 1915. The Genocide Museum-Institute of Armenia notes that Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean) survivors and descendants were long forgotten, and only in recent decades have their losses been publicly memorialized.
In 2010, Sweden’s Parliament became the first national legislature to recognize the Ottoman-era genocide of Armenians, Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean), and Greeks. The vote was narrowly passed by 131–130, prompting diplomatic protests from Turkey.
On 24 March 2015, Armenia’s National Assembly unanimously passed a resolution condemning the “genocide of the Greeks and Assyrians perpetrated by Ottoman Turkey between 1915 and 1923.” That same year, the Dutch Parliament adopted a binding resolution recognizing the Armenian, Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean), and Greek genocides, sponsored by MP Joel Voordewind, who described the vote as a “signal … to the Turkish government to acknowledge its past actions”.
In 2016, the German Bundestag passed a resolution commemorating the 1915 genocides and explicitly mentioning that “other Christian ethnic groups, especially “Aramean/Assyrian and Chaldean Christians,” were affected by deportations and massacres.
France’s Senate overwhelmingly approved, in 2023 a resolution recognizing the Sayfo and called for France’s government to do likewise, establishing 24 April as an annual day of commemoration. That measure was forwarded to the lower house for codification.
Each recognition has been largely symbolic, however, because Turkey, as the successor state to the Ottoman Empire, fiercely denies the genocide. Armenian and Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean) groups urge that every official acknowledgment be accompanied by concrete measures — such as memorial days, inclusion in school curricula, and, where possible, discussions of reparations or restitution. In fact, Armenia itself declared 9 December a “Day of Remembrance of Victims of All Genocides” in 2015 to underscore this point. Activists stress that recognition should extend beyond a gesture of moral support, it must carry practical meaning through education, memorialization, and, where feasible, material justice for victims.
Israel’s New Position and the Armenian Response
During an interview in late August 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly recognized the genocide, the first such statement by an Israeli premier.
When asked why Israel had never formally recognized the events of 1915 as genocide, he replied, “I just did. Here you go.” By this statement, Netanyahu acknowledged the Armenian, Greek, and Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean) Sayfo genocides as historical fact. Israeli media and diaspora organizations took note.
Even before Netanyahu’s remarks, Israeli officials had begun easing their resistance to the use of the term “Armenian Genocide.” Euronews observed that Israel “has long grappled” with this issue because of its ties with Turkey, but Netanyahu stated in his interview that Israel “recognizes the genocide” of Ottoman Christians.
His comments provoked immediate pushback from Ankara, which accused him of politicking, but they were welcomed by Armenian and Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean) groups. Aram Hamparian, executive director of the Armenian National Committee of America, praised Netanyahu’s words and argued that Israel should now “break … its military alliance with Azerbaijan and [apply] public pressure on Turkey to abandon its denial” of the genocide. In other words, Armenian diaspora leaders view Israel’s acknowledgment as a potential lever to press the country on its own policies. If Israel admits to this atrocity, it should no longer support states allied with the perpetrators of genocide.
Back in Yerevan, however, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan played down the impact of external recognition. He bluntly told reporters that Netanyahu’s statement “has nothing to do with the Republic of Armenia or the interests of the Armenian people.” Pashinyan emphasized that any recognition not driven by Armenia’s own strategy is irrelevant. He asked, “do we want [genocide recognition] to become geopolitical bargaining chips in the hands of others? Do we want our martyrs to be uttered casually in an interview?” He cautioned that Armenia itself should focus on its national interests and not on foreign pronouncements. In fact, Pashinyan argued that despite many countries having acknowledged the Armenian Genocide, Yerevan has seen no dividends from it. “What have we received from these recognitions?” he asked. “Is our goal to allow others to use our martyrs as bargaining chips?”
In recent years Pashinyan has repeatedly said that recognition of the Armenian Genocide was not a high diplomatic priority and should not drive Armenia’s foreign policy. His government even proclaimed an annual “Day of Remembrance of Victims of All Genocides” to address the broader context of genocidal atrocities.
Armenian officials in general have begun distancing Yerevan from the recognition campaigns, arguing that talking about genocide has offered symbolic value but not tangible gains. Pashinyan noted that many leaders who publicly recognize 1915 may be doing so for domestic or election reasons, not because it furthers Armenia’s interests. These remarks drew criticism from many scholars and activists who believe acknowledgement is a matter of moral clarity.
Armenia has pursued regional peace in other ways. In August 2025, Pashinyan and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev signed a US-brokered peace treaty ending decades of conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. In a White House ceremony with US President Donald Trump, they agreed to mutual recognition and economic ties. “It’s a long time — 35 years — they fought and now they’re friends,” Trump quipped.
The accord promises a strategic transit corridor (TRIPP) through Armenia that links Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave. Turkey, a staunch backer of Azerbaijan, welcomed the deal and said it plans to restore diplomatic relations with Yerevan once Armenia finalizes the treaty with Baku. In earlier meetings, President Erdoğan had told Pashinyan that Turkey would actively support the peace process and begin normalization talks. In June 2025, the two leaders even announced plans to eventually reopen their mutual border — closed since 1993 — and resume high-level dialogue.
Armenia has been able to lock in deals with both neighbors — a formal peace treaty with Azerbaijan and an emerging understanding with Turkey (conditional on that treaty). Some Armenian leaders feel that pressing the genocide issue with Israel or others could jeopardize these hard-won breakthroughs. Pashinyan has at times emphasized the need for stability and cautioned against “a collective victim mentality” that might antagonize Turkey or disrupt new commerce. In this diplomatic climate, Armenia has shown ambivalence about pressing foreign governments — including Israel — on genocide recognition, preferring to consolidate regional peace first.
Turning Recognition into Results
Somewhat ironically echoing Pashinyan’s skepticism of the value of genocide recognition, many activists argue that words of recognition must be turned into measures of justice. A mere resolution or news clip does little on its own. To be effective acknowledgements should trigger concrete actions.
Memorialization and Education. Countries should honor Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean) victims by funding memorials, museums, or textbooks. For example, legislators in Armenia and elsewhere have called for 7 August to be observed as an official day for remembrance of the Sayfo. Genocide recognition should also spur school curricula that include Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean) history, ensuring young people learn this chapter of World War I.
Legal and Reparative Steps. Formal acknowledgment can open the door to justice efforts. US courts have shown that recognizing genocide can enable survivor families to sue for damages. In 2010, for example, a federal appeals court allowed descendants of Armenian genocide victims to pursue insurance claims, noting that judicial recognition “gives the ability to seek reparations.” By analogy, if Turkey were ever to admit the Sayfo, Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean) survivors or heirs might be empowered to seek compensation or return of confiscated property. Turkish law does not yet allow such claims, but international pressure could change that.
Diplomatic Pressure. Legislatures that pass recognition resolutions can accompany them with calls for the Turkish government to open archives, prosecute war criminals, and publicly apologize. If Israel, or France, or the EU declares the Sayfo a genocide, they should also pressure Ankara to confront this history. This would avoid using the issue merely as a political card and instead treat it as a matter of accountability.
Minority Rights Improvements. Finally, acknowledgment at the state level can bolster the status of surviving Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean) communities. In Turkey today, these communities have limited rights. If Ankara were to recognize the Sayfo, it might also extend legal protections to Syriac people — for example restoring some civil rights, funding the Syriac language schools, or protecting historical churches. Activists note that recognition often comes hand-in-hand with initiatives to heal communities.
Sayfo recognition must be more than platitude. Armenian officials like Pashinyan worry that it has not brought Yerevan material gains. But advocates counter that its true “dividends” lie in justice and prevention of future crimes. As one Armenian legislator put it in 2015, condemning the Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean) genocide was meant as “standing in solidarity,” signaling that “we attach importance to [the] condemnation” of these crimes. Indeed, Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean) leaders say every formal recognition encourages them in their cause. Sabri Atman of the Assyrian Genocide Research Center (“Seyfo Center”) saluted Armenia for its 2015 resolution, saying it, “gives us strength to be recognized internationally.”
From the Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean) perspective, official acknowledgement is both long overdue and deeply meaningful. The community remembers the war-time massacres as a core part of its identity. Genocide scholars, including Israel’s own Benny Morris and Dror Ze’evi, have documented this “Thirty-Year Genocide” — from 1894 to 1924 — noting the fate of all Ottoman Christian peoples. Many Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean) activists say recognition is a moral obligation.
In practical terms, Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean) families cling to hope that recognition might yield some benefits. While there are no ongoing criminal prosecutions or international tribunals for 1915, survivors and descendants would welcome symbolic gestures: an apology from Turkey, the return (or at least respect) of stolen church properties, and inclusion of their story in Turkey’s history books. Indeed, legal precedents from other genocides hint at concrete outcomes. For example, after Germany’s admission of the Holocaust, Holocaust survivors received pension and restitution programs. By contrast, for Armenians, Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean), and Greeks, a Turkish admission of the genocides could, at a minimum, legitimize claims for reparations or insurance, as US Armenians have already done. It could also create political momentum to protect the remaining Assyrians of Turkey and Syria from discrimination.
There is also a spiritual and psychological benefit. The Assyrian Church of the East and Syriac Orthodox tradition both hold annual prayers for Sayfo victims. Having secular acknowledgement by modern states would validate those memories. Each new parliament or city council recognition – from Sweden to Germany – becomes part of the global narrative that the suffering was real and recognized. For many Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean) people, this acknowledgement is “justice in the long run,” a way to honor ancestors and signal that “we were not killed twice,” as one activist put it.
From 1915 to today, the Sayfo Genocide has gone from obscurity to growing, if still partial, international recognition. Armenia itself recognized it in 2015, and several Western parliaments and organizations have followed. The 2025 podcast admission by Netanyahu marks another landmark, even as Yerevan’s leadership urges caution in treating it as a victory. However, Syriac (Aramean–Assyrian–Chaldean) activists warn that recognition must not fade into the background.
Ultimately, proponents say, acknowledging the Sayfo is both a moral imperative and a foundation for lasting reconciliation. They call on all governments — Israel included — to ensure that recognition is not just an interview soundbite but a catalyst for real justice. In their view, when, and if, Turkey acknowledges the Sayfo, survivors and descendants should gain something tangible. The year 2025 shows how acknowledgement is winning currency in world capitals. The question now is whether the momentum can be organized into effective support for the Sayfo’s victims and their heirs.