Questions for the Government of Lebanon

This article was originally published by Nidaal Watan on 11 February 2025. The original can be found here.

By Hicham Bou Nassif | Weinberg Associate Professor of International Relations and the Middle East and George R. Roberts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College-California

By what standard should Hezbollah and Nabih Berri not have been represented in the recently formed Lebanese government, let alone granting Berri the Ministry of Finance? From the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri to dragging Lebanon into a devastating war with Israel in 2006, to the invasion of Beirut and the Mountain in 2008, to the series of assassinations targeting the March 14 forces, and finally to entangling Lebanon in the 2023 support war, no internal or external actor has harmed our country as much as the Khomeinist “Party.”

As for Nabih Berri, he is undoubtedly the worst Speaker of Parliament in our modern history. During the October 17 Revolution, the Parliament Police, under Berri’s authority, fired live bullets at unarmed protesters. It is well known that the South Council, also under Berri’s control, has been swallowing Lebanese taxpayers’ money for decades without oversight. Moreover, Berri exacerbated the dysfunction of an already paralyzed system by making the opening and closing of Parliament contingent upon the whims of his Khomeinist backers. In truth, this article cannot begin to list all the misdeeds committed by the Shiite “duo” over recent decades. What are they doing in a government that is supposed to be a rescue government?

The answer given by Lebanon’s ruling elites is that the new government does not want to exclude anyone. Translation: No matter what the “duo” does or commits, they represent the Shiites. Therefore, their participation in central authority is inevitable. In this way, the Taif system forces all components to endure the dominance of one faction, or else everything is paralyzed, the government does not gain confidence, the streets may erupt, and the country may plunge into chaos.

This is also how the idea of holding wrongdoers accountable becomes pure fantasy, and everyone hides behind the slogan “No victor, no vanquished,” a guarantee that political forces exchange among themselves, whereby theatrical insults and sectarian mobilization are merely political performances that quickly dissolve once all parties gather at the table to form a government.

In reality, Lebanon suffers from a systemic crisis that lies at the root of its hardships. The government will not address this crisis because its forces are comfortable with the status quo. However, there remains a minimal threshold of responsibility that the government must confront, foremost among which is the issue of weapons.

To recall, weeks have passed since the ceasefire agreement that Israel imposed on the defeated “Hezbollah,” yet the Lebanese army has not seized a single illegal weapons cache to date. What does the government intend to do about Hezbollah’s remaining arsenal? Further, what will it do about the weapons in Palestinian camps, the weaponry of Beqaa clans, and the arms of smuggling networks linked to them? These are pressing issues that cannot tolerate delay or appeasement. The matter is clear: Either the state exists, or it does not.

The judgment of this government and this presidential term will remain suspended, awaiting an answer to this question before any other.

As for reforms, they must proceed along two parallel tracks. First, devising a plan to return depositors’ funds. Second, transitioning the concept of expanded decentralization from a slogan that everyone praises to reality on the ground. Decentralization, among other things, entails the opening of two new civilian airports in Hamat and Qlayaat. There is not a single justification for maintaining the monopoly of the current airport near Beirut’s southern suburbs, as opening two additional airports is technically simple if the political will exists. So, does it exist?

These, in summary, are the three issues by which the Lebanese people will judge the government and this presidential term: weapons, depositors’ funds, and decentralization. If the authorities fail to address these matters, Lebanon’s future will be no different from its tragic past. If they succeed, then we will have moved closer to a solution. However, the solution itself, its prerequisite being a transformation of the centralized system, requires the emergence of new forces willing to engage in a long-term confrontation with the Taif regime.