When Arabs Embrace the Choices of Our First Republic

By Hicham Bou Nassif | Weinberg Associate Professor of International Relations and the Middle East and George R. Roberts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College-California

Lebanon’s foreign policy during its First Republic — the era following its independence — was characterized by several defining orientations. Foremost among them was a commitment to maintaining friendly relations with the West, even at the height of the Cold War. Lebanese leaders also made a deliberate choice to avoid direct confrontation with Israel. This approach, in practice, carried an implicit acknowledgment of Israel’s right to exist, setting Lebanon apart from other Arab states that were pursuing a policy of perpetual hostility. 

In the realm of inter-Arab relations, Lebanon’s alignment was clear. It leaned toward the pro-Western axis: the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq, the Gulf states, Ma’ruf al-Dawalibi and the short-lived “secessionist” Syrian government between 1961 and 1963, and most notably, King Hussein of Jordan. At the same time, Lebanon remained cautious — even wary — of more radical regimes and organizations such as those led by Muammar Gaddafi, the Ba’athists, Fatah, and the Nasserist movement. 

These Lebanese positions were not merely theoretical. They translated into concrete policies, implemented by successive presidents of the republic. Lebanon participated symbolically in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war but refused to be drawn into subsequent Arab-Israeli conflicts. It also declined to sever diplomatic relations with France and Britain in 1956 and stayed away from pan-Arab unity projects such as those pursued by Syria. From the beginning, Lebanon became the target of open hostility from other Arab regimes, which denied it the right to national sovereignty under the pretext of larger pan-Arab causes — especially given Lebanon’s perceived Western and Christian identity. 

One need not recount all the suffering Lebanon endured at the hands of Arab regimes that treated it with a blend of contempt, cruelty, and inferiority. It suffices to recall the direct role of Hafez al-Assad’s regime in toppling the 17 May Agreement in 1983 — an accord that could have stemmed the bloodshed then ravaging Lebanon. This sabotage was aided by Libya under Gaddafi, various Palestinian factions, and a broader Arab refusal to exert any pressure on Assad for Lebanon’s sake. Left to the mercy of Damascus, Lebanon later fell prey to Shiite expansionism and Hezbollah’s weaponry. 

Why revisit all this now? Because recent weeks have witnessed two significant developments. First, Syrian leader Ahmad al-Sharaa publicly expressed his wish to join the Abraham Accords — the normalization agreements between Arab states and Israel. He even stated that Syria and Israel share common enemies and could collaborate to enhance regional security. Second, audio recordings of Egypt’s late President Gamal Abdel Nasser have resurfaced, in which he openly ridicules the radical Arab regimes that insisted on waging war against Israel. Nasser stated clearly that if he were to fight again, it would be only to liberate Egyptian land in Sinai — not for the cause of Palestine. 

These statements are revealing. They suggest that Lebanon’s First Republic was right to reject the dogmas of outdated Arab radicalism. No regime was more consistently aggressive toward Lebanon than Syria’s, always under the guise of defending Palestine and Arab unity. Yet today, Ahmad al-Sharaa speaks as a Syrian concerned with national interest — not as a pan-Arabist or Islamic ideologue. Similarly, when President Camille Chamoun in the 1950s refused to surrender Lebanon’s sovereignty to Nasserism, or later to Palestinian arms or the Syrian occupation, he was acting as a Lebanese patriot. The tragedy is not that the vision he upheld was wrong — but that he was right far too early. 

What applied to the Arab-Israeli conflict also holds for Lebanon’s posture toward the West. Today, who among the Arabs still truly opposes the West? Ahmad al-Sharaa, who rushed to meet with Donald Trump weeks ago — a move that sparked jubilation in Damascus? The regime of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt? The remnants of Fatah in the West Bank? Apart from Iran’s few remaining proxies, no serious Arab political force is genuinely anti-Western anymore. Here too, the choices made by Lebanon’s First Republic appear wiser in retrospect than Nasser’s defiant rhetoric, such as his famous taunt that if the Americans didn’t like his policies, they could go drink the Mediterranean Sea — and, if that wasn’t enough, the Red Sea as well. 

This is not to suggest that today’s Arab regimes have become mirror images of Lebanon’s First Republic. Yes, they have grown more mature and their perspectives more pragmatic, but Lebanon’s early experience was unique in other ways too. It protected media freedom, upheld pluralistic political life, and held regular competitive elections — all things that remain largely absent across the Arab world today. In this sense, while Lebanon’s neighbors may have finally begun to see the world more clearly, they are still far from replicating a century-old experiment in democratic governance. And for those Lebanese who once helped destroy their own country in the name of ideologies that history has since discredited, there remains a simple truth: they should be ashamed of themselves.